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“In this context the proposition that tools are prolongations of
human organs can be inverted to state that the organs are also
prolongations of the tools.”
1
* This lecture will also be published in the ASIL Proceedings, forthcoming 2020.
** Professor of International Law (University of Helsinki), Member of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences. This was the “Grotius Lecture” given at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law on March 26, 2019. I have
preserved some of the spoken character of the lecture but also amplified it by
passages from my T.M.C. Asser Lecture of 2019, “International Law and the Far
Right: Reflections on Law and Cynicism” (published with T.M.C Asser Press 2019).
1. Max Horkheimer, Traditional and Critical Theory, in CRITICAL THEORY:
SELECTED ESSAYS, 188, 201 (1972).
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The theme for this year’s meeting of the American Society of
International Law is “International Law as an Instrument.” That
invokes a modern, rational idea often associated with the European
Enlightenment, making a distinction between means and ends and
drawing attention from the latter to the former. Instead of engaging in
complex, often interminable debates about the purposes of human
activity, it invites us to think about the efficiency of the technical tools
we use to seek to attain those purposes. This shift also has its well-
known problems: is it possible, or useful, to think about the tools in
abstraction of their point? A powerful current of twentieth century
political thinking attacked what it called “instrumental rationality.”
One-sided attention to the tools of modern life, that is the argument,
has created a techno-economic juggernaut that had contributed and
continues to contribute to the destruction of important social values
and may now threaten the survival of the human species. Even if one
does not share the dystopian predictions of some of this critique, the
“Dialectic of the Enlightenment” has long been part of our cultural
baggage and justifies turning the assumptions behind this year’s
meeting on their head and asking, if international law is a tool, what is
it a tool for?
2
It is sometimes said that international law is an instrument of the
“international community.” But that view was always hard to defend.
What is the “international community”? How do you know what it
wants? There is a respectable, well-known literature on the “binding
force of international law.” Textbooks still rehearse theories from
Austin to Kelsen, Jellinek to Hart, Lauterpacht to McDougal.
Naturalism, sociological theories, rational choice, functionalism, legal
process all aim to explain the point of international law and why we
should obey it. But all that feels somehow outdated. These theories
come from the nineteenth and early twentieth century and virtually
nothing fresh has been written on the issue of “basis of obligation” for
2. THEODOR ADORNO & MAX HORKHEIMER, THE DIALECTIC OF THE
ENLIGHTENMENT xi (1974). Despite the power of that work, a good argument can be
made so as to historicize it as an analysis of the mid-twentieth century situation of
total war and the authoritarian turn in liberal-democratic societies. Although much
of its analysis is still relevant, this is perhaps not true of the suggestion of state
capitalism as the final form of liberal society.
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decades.
3
I suppose this is an effect of the fact that, as Samuel Moyn
has put it, we “live among the ruins of inconclusive confrontation and
fragmentation” of legal theories, including theories about the purpose
of international law.
4
Instead of reviewing these theories once again, I
will assume that while they may explain some aspect of whatever faith
some of us may have in international law, none of them explains why
we—and I mean by “we” people whose business it is to work in and
with those institutions and who are involved in their endless reforms—
yield to it. We yield because it is so hard to imagine alternatives; we
allow ourselves to be “enchanted” by it.
As the famous quote from the sixteenth century French lawyer
Michel de Montaigne provides, “[n]ow the laws maintain their credit
not because they are just, but because they are laws. This is the
mystical basis of their authority; they have no other.”
5
Montaigne
made this point at a time of religious war to persuade Frenchmen not
to look for transcendental foundation of authority. Just shut up and
obey. Montaigne, like his lawyer-colleague Jean Bodin, agreed that it
was better to live even under a tyranny than the endless civil war
occasioned by religious-ideological conflict. Eventually, France
would emerge from internal strife as a reasonably stable country. We
have learned to call this unthinkingly respectful attitude to law
“positivism,” and to be critical about it.
6
Although it did help to end
3. Texts about “legitimacy” in which political and legal theorists (but rarely
international lawyers) rehearse these topics within the conventions of analytical
jurisprudence have been an odd outlier. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, The Legitimacy
of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Samantha
Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
4. Samuel Moyn, Legal Theory Among the Ruins, in SEARCHING FOR
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT, 99, 101 (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2017) [hereinafter Moyn, Legal Theory Among the Ruins].
5. MICHEL DEMONTAIGNE, THECOMPLETE ESSAYS 353 (1993).
6. One of the reasons for the outdated and unhelpful character of much of
modern legal theory is that it tends to assume a fundamental opposition between
“positivism” and “natural law.” Lawyers such as Montaigne or Bodin were,
however, both simultaneously finding the explanation for binding authority from
natural (and perhaps ultimately divine) law while they deemed its content to be fixed
in “positive” enactments by existing authority. “Naturalism” and “positivism”
presuppose the correctness of each other (one answers the question of the binding
force, the other of the content of the law). That is why a legal theory that presupposes
their opposition goes nowhere. As rhetorical choices, however, the two have their
sense, the one being more persuasive when fundamental questions about authority
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the bloodshed, it also founded royal absolutism. At which point it
began again to seem useful to look for an explanation. Why, indeed
should we obey the laws handed down to us by authority? “Man was
born free, yet everywhere he is in chains,” Rousseau quipped as he
was interpreting the institutions of the old regime.
7
During a civil war,
it may have seemed prudent to refrain from asking too many questions.
But when the pragmatic benefit of obedience was no longer so
obvious, and people would start posing the “why” question, then a
wholly different world—I hesitate to say “can of worms”—was
opened.
There was long a “Montaigne moment” in international law. During
the cold war, we yielded because of the good pragmatic sense of
“peaceful coexistence.” The world was a dangerous place—let us not
rock the boat. But obedience turned from choice to enchantment when
we could no longer remember why it was we had once decided to
yield. In the late 1980s and early 1990s I took part in perhaps a dozen
UN General Assembly sessions, from mid-September all the way to
Christmas. Flying back to Helsinki someone in the delegation would
invariably exclaim “Oh what tough time we had. Such long meetings.
And isn’t it hard to think whether anything useful was achieved.” And
then in a hesitant voice, you would hear someone else make the point:
“But isn’t it anyway better that we have the UN than that we wouldn’t
have it”? This was the voice of ideology. Enchantment was speaking.
“How do you know?”
This is what I mean by “enchanted by the tools.” The readiness to
support international law independently of any clear view of howwhat
it does relates to its ends, out of the sense that we cannot live without
it. If asked why it is there, we may provide some historicist cliché—
like “universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose,” for example—
or refer to some sociology of interdependence or a generalization
about the nature of the human species. Such responses are both
convincing and fragile, less matters of argument than objects of
unthinking commitment. Perhaps they no longer seem that powerful?
arise (at moments of “revolution,” typically), the other when addressing well-
established, stable institutions.
7. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in THESOCIALCONTRACTAND
THE FIRST AND SECONDDISCOURSES, 151, 156 (Susan Dunn ed., 2002).
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What about Brexit or American disengagement from multilateralism?
Or the recent revolt in Europe and North America against the
transatlantic and transpacific trade and investment treaties, stalling the
expansion of free trade, and the coming paralysis of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Appellate Body owning to U.S. reluctance to
appoint new members. In his address to the UN General Assembly in
2019, the president of the United States said this: “The future does not
belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs
to sovereign and independent nations who protect their citizens,
respect their neighbors, and honor the differences that make each
country special and unique.”
The president of the United States gave voice to those who have
been disenchanted by what he chose to call “globalism.” His
speechwriters might have included international law, at least
international law in its global governance mode, had they given the
matter any thought, which they probably had not. That is the mode of
law that arose in the 1990s and suggested that nation-states had
become hopelessly inadequate as mechanisms for managing the
world’s problems. Under this mode, the world was to be ruled by
global institutions, governmental as well as supranational, public as
well as private, by reference to objectives that had nothing essential to
do with nation-states: free trade, clean environment, economic
development, human rights, post-conflict governance and so on. Each
“issue-area” would be ruled in global regimes with its own type of
professionalism and teleology.
8
The U.S. president’s attack against “globalists” no doubt resonated
among those in his audience who had become disenchanted with the
1990s global governance ethos and felt that something about it was
responsible for the grievances they felt. Of course, disenchantment is
not at all necessarily a bad thing. As Leonard Cohen once put it,
“[t]here is a crack in everything, and that’s how the light gets in.”
Disenchantment involves loss of unthinking faith, and perhaps
realization that something about that faith had not only been mistaken
but the very source of our troubles. The shackles of what Kant used to
8. See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law as “Global Governance,” in
SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 4, at 199 (Justin
Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017).
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call our “self-incurred immaturity” are broken.
9
This might then
enable a sharper (more “mature”) awareness of the world, and our
place in it. That is one theory. But then there is another kind of
disenchantment. A faith is lost. But instead of this leading to the
dissolution of “immaturity,” and the opening up of a world where (as
Kant hoped) we would treat each other “as an end, and never merely
as a means,”
10
we find ourselves with all of the critical tools of
enlightenment, but none of its promised liberation. The ideals of
universal solidarity and progress, born with the imperative of critique,
proved excessively ambitious. Failing to reach them, we did not fall
back to where we started, but to a different place where those ideals
began to appear as the very instruments of our enslavement. The
outcome is rage against those whose theories brought us nothing but
misery.
11
The vocabularies and institutions of global governance that arose in
the 1990s are being challenged from many sides today. These
challenges build on different kinds of experience and their local
themes vary. But they are united by a certain disappointment with the
turn to global governance in 1990s. This disappointment may have
both an enlightened and cynical effect. In order to understand the
ongoing anti-globalist surge, I suggest examining, first, the way in
which the professional classes in Europe and the United States were
enchanted by the tools of global governance. I will then move to
discuss how that enchantment wore off among the populations of the
developed north with respect to two of its key aspects: expert
knowledge and the politics of rights. In the final section I will take up
the question of what it would require turning that disenchantment from
its presently cynical manifestations into constructive work so as to
move beyond the globalism of the 1990s. If at all possible, this seems
to require nothing less than reimagining the nature and roles of
technical expertise and politics in the government of our increasingly
vulnerable societies.
9. IMMANUELKANT, KANT’S POLITICALWRITINGS 54 (Hans Reiss ed., 1971).
10. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38
(Mary Gregor ed., 1998).
11. See generally PETER SLOTERDIJK, CRITIQUE OFCYNICALREASON (1987).
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I. ENCHANTMENT: 1960 TO 2000
The 1960s was a time of massive cultural change in the secular
West. The truths of earlier generations—their patriotism, their
legalism, and their Cold War spirit—became old hat. Wolfgang
Friedmann’s 1964 book The Changing Structures of International
Law provides a wonderfully perceptive account of that moment.
Sketching what he called a move from co-existence to cooperation,
Friedmann used the vocabulary of interdependence and expansion to
stress the fundamentally international nature of that moment:
technological progress, environment, trade, development: “ . . . beside
the level of interstate relations of a diplomatic character there develops
a new and constantly expanding area of co-operative international
relations.” He imagined that the European Communities might be seen
as “a possible precursor of a future integration of mankind.”
12
“[T]he
national state,” Friedmann wrote, “and its symbol, national
sovereignty, are becoming increasingly inadequate to meet the needs
of our time.”
13
The 1960s was tough on the traditional values, national,
religious, agrarian, bourgeois. It appreciated plurality and
individualism:
[T]he necessity to protect the individual as such internationally, even
against his own state, has become an accepted postulate of international
lawyers, and the recurrent subject of international debate.
14
“Even against his own state”—it was not surprising that a refugee
from Germany would make this point. But many other international
lawyers followed suit, and not only in the United States.
Now flash forward to the 1990s: the end of the Cold War, the
emergence of the European Union, intensification of international
cooperation in trade, development, environment technology, resource
management, even democracy— all of such developments outlined
and celebrated by Thomas Franck from New York University in
1998.
15
Analysts everywhere began to write about a “New World
12. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 19 (1964).
13. Id. at 365–66.
14. Id. at 376.
15. See generally THOMASM. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
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Order” that could include anything from cooperation between the
judicial branches of different countries, to humanitarian intervention,
from supranational environmental regulation to the establishment of
an International Criminal Court.
16
With the WTO, regulatory focus
shifted from customs tariffs to domestic industrial, labor, and
environmental policies, some of the core functions of statehood.
17
Human rights bodies would begin to undertake close surveys of
administrative practices; there was talk about lifting the immunity of
domestic political leaders in face of international prosecutions. The
World Development Report of 1997 by the World Bank chose to
reimagine the streamlined functions of the state in a global world. The
time of “technocrats” with “fanciful schemes” was over. Although at
several places, the Bank reported that its objective was not to
“dismantle the state,” it was clear that it was to be restricted to its basic
functions, especially to providing security, while its role in producing
social services was to be limited to a minimum as much more could
be done in “partnerships with firms and citizens.” The thrust was on
“market liberalization and privatization.”
18
Never has law played a more visible role in international life than
in the long 1990s.
19
When confronted with a problem, the first thing
we learned to ask was “what has international law to say about this”?
If there was international violence, we wanted to know whether
Chapter VII of the UN Charter had been applied. A political crisis
arose—and we are worried about basic human rights. Have crimes
against humanity been committed? Should prosecutions begin with the
International Criminal Court? If there was friction with free trade—
we enquired if a domestic policy, for example a labor or agricultural
policy, amounted to “unfair” protectionism prohibited under theWTO
treaties. Should a panel or the Appellate Body be seized? And what
INSTITUTIONS (1995).
16. Moyn, Legal Theory Among the Ruins, supra note 4, at 101–02.
17. ANDREWLANG, WORLD TRADE LAWAFTERNEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 221, 229, 230, 270 (2011); Anne Orford,
Theorizing Free Trade, in OXFORDHANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 731–33 (Anne Orford & Florian Hoffmann eds., 2016).
18. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, 6, 61–62
(1997).
19. MARCEL GAUCHET, L’AVÈNEMENT DE LA DÉMOCRATIE: LE NOUVEAU
MONDE, 521–604 (2017).
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about political unrest at home? Has there been discrimination? Have
basic human rights standards been applied? Have courts been
appropriately seized and standards of due process adequately
followed? A lot of ink was spent by academic jurists on the
“constitutionalization” of this or that aspect of foreign policy. Some
were keen to develop a “global administrative law.”
20
The audiences at home were often unimpressed. What they felt at
home was austerity, the narrowing down of possibilities of political
contestation, and the rise of a new technocracy wedded to what the
historian Timothy Snyder has called the “politics of inevitability.”
21
While the UN, the European Union, and countless “global
governance” institutions were busily engaged in their problem-solving
tasks, domestic audiences were feeling an increasing sense of
alienation. In the 2010s, this alienation was given voice by far-right
manipulators pointing to the coincidence between the expansion of
global governance and the stagnation of the middle classes in Europe
and the United States. Where was the process going? Was global
governance more than a ploy by “unaccountable elites” to consolidate
their privileges? Today, far-right demagogues have enlisted popular
disenchantment in support of “taking back control,” a cynical effort to
push through a reactionary political agenda. The immediate target was
the neoliberal spirit of the 1990s, but the political attack has been
channeled to the opening of the West since the 1960s to the world
outside that reversed the hierarchies of tradition. Slogans like “Make
America Great Again” propagate a return to a supposedly better past.
It seeks to restore a system of control familiar from a previous
generation, control by white men over their homes and societies, a
time when cosmopolitan elitists, feminists, Jewish philanthropists, gay
journalists, and African refugees did not tell us how to think or what
to do!
20. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence
of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
21. See TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE,
AMERICA 7 (2018).
406 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [35:3
II. DISENCHANTMENT 1: KNOWLEDGE
What irritates the anti-globalists to no end is that the power of global
institutions does not at all present itself as values or preferences—as
conventional politics—but as knowledge; international experts rule
because they are experts, because they know that climate change is
true, that increasing prison sentences have no effect on criminality,
and that the greatest to suffer from Brexit are its supporters. Check the
facts! That exchange is patronizing; there is no conversation, only
surrender is available. On the one side, truth, and on the other,
ignorance. And yet, as the experts themselves know very well, opinion
and choice exist at both ends. Positivism died long ago, replaced by
the more complex tools of structuralism and hermeneutics, all the
fuzzy science that tells us that “facts” always appear in regimes of
knowledge which, though true on their own terms, are no longer solid
when we compare them with each other, or look inside their
constituent elements. If there is anything international lawyers have
learned from the debate on “fragmentation” it is that what one may
want to say on a given problem depends on which type of knowledge
one uses to look at it.
22
And as soon as one has found the relevant
knowledge, one will find out that it is divided into an orthodox and a
heterodox view. The backlashers have noticed this; the institutions do
not represent “facts,” but rather opinions. The enchantment is broken.
Behind the façade there are policies that can and ought to be contested.
“Austerity” is a choice, not a necessity.
The instruments of global law operate in a field of great complexity.
Environment, trade, investment, development, and security—each
toolbox invokes specialized knowledge but also value: each has a
powerful ethos or a project, a policy to advance. To be a trade lawyer
is also to think of trade law as good. To have been educated in
environmental law is also to have internalized the goals of
environmental law. But what if both deal with the same issue? Which
to choose? Trade or environment? Security or privacy? Global
22. See U.N. Secretary-General, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶
21–26, U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/L.682 (April 13, 2006); see also ANNE-CHARLOTTE
MARTINEAU, LE DÉBAT SUR LA FRAGMENTATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL: UNE
ANALYSE CRITIQUE (2015).
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governance involves a clash of knowledges, clash of rival and
incompatible instrumentalities: each tool with its objectives, its
professional culture and its value-system. Once you know which
institution will deal with a problem, you already know how it will be
dealt with. Is crisis in Central Africa a human rights problem or an
economic development problem? The answer depends on whom you
ask, the High Commissioner of Human Rights or the World Bank?
And is post-conflict governance in Kosovo a matter of security, of
adequate housing and employment or of educating girls?
Peacekeeping professionals, social development experts, and human
rights activists will each provide a different answer, each with equal
conviction. Truth is not one but many. And they are in struggle.
23
The anti-globalists have noticed this. The trade expert wants more
trade, and the environmental scientist more protection, the interior
ministry wants more surveillance, the justice ministry less. It is all so
predictable. Imagine a discussion on post-conflict governance
between a police officer, a human rights lawyer, a teacher and an
architect. The police officer will want to eradicate insecurity in the
streets, the human rights lawyer points to poverty in the community.
The teacher would prefer expanding the education of the girls while
the architect has in mind a housing project. Each possesses a view of
the objectives and instrumentalities of the international world, as
suggested by the techniques they have learned to master. Each believes
available resources would be best used if directed to their field, if their
project became a project for that society itself. The unavoidable
impression with the outsider is that the certainty each side claims for
its knowledge is only a sham. What the experts are actually doing, is
trying to monopolize available resources and prestige not for the
general but for private advantage. No doubt, experts may often be
brought into consultation with one another, to debate their varying
objectives in meetings at Geneva, New York, or any other such global
center.
24
But the anti-globalists know that however the debate will go,
they will have no say in it. They have none of those languages. Instead
23. DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW AND
EXPERTISE SHAPEGLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016).
24. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, How to Avoid Regime Collisions, in CONTESTED
REGIME COLLISIONS: NORM FRAGMENTATION IN WORLD SOCIETY, 58–70 (Kerstin
Blome et al., eds., 2016).
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they have one recollection, namely that “whatever the expertise—we
will always lose in the end; whatever the policy, it is bound to treat us
as an ignorant underclass.”
In principle, it might seem possible to back down from this
infighting by suggesting that it is up to the governments that fund them
to decide on their objectives. Sovereign states are, after all, supposedly
the “masters of the treaties.” But modern government is just a local
version of an international negotiation. A country’s delegates in the
conference of the parties to an environmental treaty speak one
language, the same country’s representatives in a World Bank meeting
another. The environment minister represents an environmental
knowledge that is utterly global; the finance ministry is a kind of local
bureau of the World Bank or the European Central Bank—while the
justice minister never ceases reminding everyone of the protections
the offered by the human rights treaty system. Domestic departments
operate on the basis of systems of knowledge that have nothing
“domestic” about them. No wonder. Their personnel were once
Erasmus students and are now constantly on travel to Brussels,
Washington, Beijing . . . . All governance today is global governance.
No surprise the anti-globalists feel alienated; they do not sit at those
meetings; but even if they did, they would not know what to say.
But not only have expert languages colonized everything so that it
seems impossible to choose between them, they are also utterly split
within themselves. I used to take part in the public debates around
2015 concerning the proposed treaty on transatlantic trade and
investment (TTIP) and its follow-up, the EU-Canada (CETA)
initiative. The question often arose whether private-public arbitration
in those treaties might enhance investment—whether it made
economic sense for a state to accept the possibility of being sued by
an investor in an international arbitration process. There were always
two economists. One claimed that the presence of such clauses
invariably attracted investors—the other retorted that they made no
difference whatsoever.
25
Once they had made their points, they then
began to attack the respective “models” they had used to come to their
25. See JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL
WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 155–79
(2017).
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opposite conclusions. The feeling of disbelief and frustration in the
audience was tangible— “must we really take a stand on the relative
merits of economic models in order to decide whether to support
investment agreements or not?”
Of course, they would not. And of course, models do not work like
that. As the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik reminds us, “The correct
answer to almost any question is: It depends. Different models, each
equally respectable, provide different answers.”
26
From this the
backlashers have drawn the conclusion that there really is no
difference between expert “knowledge” and opinion, truth and bias.
You could always find an economist, a lawyer, an engineer, to defend
whatever needs defending. What the expert says is just cynically
dressed as knowledge so as to lift it outside political contestation so as
to exclude me!
The knowledge-systems that support global governance are not
homogeneous billiard balls. Like sovereign states, they are divided
between those who rule and those who are in the opposition,
orthodoxy, and heterodoxy. The best experts know very well that their
field is fundamentally divided, especially about the fundamentals.
While appearances can be kept by agreeing on what lies on the surface,
problems emerge on how to explain it. Their disenchantment has
infected their audiences. Everyone has seen experts speak from
boundless self-confidence—yet constantly contradicting each other or
being shown to have been mistaken or biased. But there has been no
accountability. So, the anti-globalists have concluded that these are
just people in bad faith, speaking down to us in esoteric languages.
Privilege disguised as knowledge. According to a study by Pew
Research in the United States from July 2017, 58 percent of
Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say colleges and
universities have a negative effect on the way things are going in the
country.
27
26. DANI RODRIK, ECONOMICS RULES: WHY ECONOMICS WORKS, WHEN IT
FAILS, ANDHOW TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE, 17 (2015).
27. Hannah Fingerhut, Republicans Skeptical of Colleges’ Impact on U.S., but
Most See Benefits for Workplace Preparation, PEW RES. CTR. (July 20, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/20/republicans-skeptical-of-
colleges-impact-on-u-s-but-most-see-benefits-for-workforce-preparation. See also
Tom Nichols, How America Lost Faith in Expertise, FOR. AFF. (Apr. 2017),
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The rise of global governance institutions in the 1990s took place
almost accidentally, without much discussion of its social effects.
Discussing in the 1950s the interwar internationalization of economic
decisions, Karl Polanyi said once that the “separa[tion of] the people
from power over their own economic life” had been an important
contributor to the rise of Fascism in Europe.
28
History never repeats
itself as such. But as the philosopher Didier Eribon has shown more
recently, today’s resentment takes the same direction. There is a sense
that the values of the city have received automatic priority so that the
provincial town is left to decay economically, socially, and culturally.
Eribon remembers how his father, together with his father’s trade
union friends, everyone active as communists, used to struggle for
improved labor conditions in the factory, expressing solidarity with
Turkish guest workers. Now the factory is gone, and so is solidarity.
Everyone now votes for Marine Le Pen.
29
In her study of popular
attitudes in ruralWisconsin, Katherine Cramer has found out that there
is feeling that the “people of the city,” especially those with jobs with
the government, have utterly lost touch with the greatest part of the
country. With their fancy jobs they now look down on everyone else
and show no respect. When the inhabitants of rural Wisconsin (and of
many other places) look around, they remember (rightly or not) that
maybe twenty, maybe forty years ago, these towns and those fields
looked prosperous and were well looked after. And now the factories
have closed, farming hardly pays off and the young have moved away.
No resources are directed from the capital to the towns any longer, and
the only visit politicians make there is the single trip just before the
elections.
30
Anti-globalism appeals to that experience and that resentment. This
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-13/how-america-
lost-faith-expertise.
28. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMICORIGINS OFOUR TIME, 231, 233–34 (2001).
29. DIDIER ERIBON, RETURNING TOREIMS (2013).
30. See KATHERINE CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN WISCONSIN AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER 131–37 (2016);
see also KATHERINE CRAMER, The Politics of Resentment in Contemporary US
Populism Conference Amsterdam, YOUTUBE (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=My3_lb8x-gM (including an update after the
2016 election as a public lecture).
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is not absolute deprivation, of course—the people in Wisconsin are
not “poor” by any standard. But the decline is real and prompts the
memory of a better past, a time of confidence in one’s status, and the
further improvement to come. And when the loss of this confidence is
explained as unavoidable owing to the “facts” of globalization, while
the “facts” are less than solid, rejection no longer seems
incomprehensible. Instead of knowledge, “fake news.”
III. DISENCHANTMENT 2: POLITICS
The other aspect of the disenchantment about the tools of global
governance has to do with the diminishing space left for political
engagement—or at least engagement not packaged in the narrow
terms of global governance speech, institutional reform, and budgetary
allocations. Focusing on the instrumentalities and efficiencies is so
much easier than trying to address the opaque worlds of desire and
value somewhere beyond what it is we presently do. But if
international law’s fragmentation is a special case of what social
theorists have analyzed as the functional differentiation of our
societies (as I have argued elsewhere), then a real difficulty emerges
to point out a uniting telos somewhere beyond the special teloi of our
practices and the respective regimes of technical knowledge-
production.
31
“Functional differentiation in general causes systemic
and social, problems which the systems themselves cannot solve.”
32
The “systemic problem” here is the absence of a unifying morality or
a standpoint, a superior set of standards (such as a religion) by
reference to which the special objectivities of regimes and toolsets
could be weighted and their appropriate place in some overall structure
be determined.
International lawyers have often been a vanguard against the “death
of metanarratives” so characteristic of the twentieth century
experience. When professional international law emerged toward the
end of the nineteenth century, it had a reasonably clear sense of the
31. See Martti Koskenniemi, Hegemonic Regimes, in REGIME INTERACTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION, at 305, 313 (Margaret Young ed.,
2011).
32. HAUKE BRUNKHORST, CRITICAL THEORY OF LEGAL REVOLUTIONS:
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES, 54 (2014).
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direction where history was going and where its own stakes lay: to
assist the march of history was to spread liberal legislation in Europe
and to civilize the colonies. With modernity, things would get more
international. The esprit d’internationalité that inspired that first
generation of international jurist projected nationalism and socialism
as potentially dangerous, essentially anachronistic movements to be
overcome by what Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns chose to call in the first
issue of the first international law journal in 1869 “a more elevated
patriotism” that would take account of the needs and interests of
neighboring nations and engage in the international solution of
common problems.
33
In the aftermath of World War I, jurists began to
think of nationalism and sovereignty themselves as obstructions on
history’s natural course. Had it not been precisely their misguided
patriotism that had driven Europeans to die on the battlefield in
defense of causes that few would understand.
“Internationalism,” “functionalism,” “solidarity,” “progress”—
these were some of the new watchwords with which interwar jurists
debate the teleology of international law. In the Francophone world,
Durkheimian lawyers such as Georges Scelle speculated about the
forces of solidarity that would bring nations together to administer the
constantly expanding realm of common interests. In the Anglophone
realm, Paul Reinisch inaugurated a “functionalism” that focused on
the practical work of technical institutions and would, as Jan Klabbers
has noted, draw inspiration from colonial government so as to launch
“a century of writing on international institutional law . . . postulating
an ethical duty to cooperate on the international level, reinforced by
practical necessities and resulting in a ‘concrete and practical’
cosmopolitanism.”
34
Of course, not everyone agreed. Realist lawyers
in Britain, such as Sir Alfred Zimmern, were deeply skeptical about
projecting supranational ambitions to the League.
35
That the Covenant
33. Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns,De l’étude de la législation comparée et du droit
international, in REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 1,
16–17 (1869). See also Martti Koskenniemi & Ville Kari, A More Elevated
Patriotism: The Emergence of International and Comparative Law (19th Century),
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY, 974–99 (Heikki
Pihlajamäki, Markus Dubber & Mark Godfrey eds., 2018).
34. Jan Klabbers, The Emergence of Functionalism in International Institutional
Law: Colonial Inspirations, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 645, 674-75 (2014).
35. ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OFNATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918–
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had been drafted as part of the peace treaty with Germany lent
credence to Carl Schmitt’s view of it as an instrument of Anglo-
American hegemony—an analysis that realist political thinkers such
as EH Carr would be the first to approve, though in a different idiom.
36
During the Cold War, it would become utterly unrealistic to postulate
shared objectives behind international law. “Peaceful coexistence”
was all that could be achieved; at a time of mutual threat of nuclear
annihilation, that did not seem at all too bad. Objectives of free trade
could always be pursued under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) system that, however, way into the 1980s was more
about tariff reductions than intervening in domestic industrial and
labor policies in view of their potentially distorting effects on free
trade. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights did rally
liberal politicians and nations in efforts to give human rights a more
determined and legally binding form—an effort eventually
crystallizing in the 1966 covenants of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and Civil and Political Rights. But more significant advances
were attained within the confines of regional institutions.
37
International law remained a coordinating devise, as Friedmann had
analyzed it.
No doubt, we often think of the technical tools offered by
international law as instruments of international “justice.” Despite the
semantic openness of that notion, it would not be hard to identify as
the most important set of justice-objectives in post-war international
law those that were supported by states emerging from decolonization
in the 1960s. Although those claims were often dressed in traditional
terms as the justice of sovereignty, as one leading Third World jurist,
Mohammed Bedjaoui, stressed, this did not mean simply or even
predominantly political independence. Sovereignty that did not extend
to economic relations was a mere “phantom sovereignty.”
38
The idea
1935 (1936).
36. CARL SCHMITT, DER NOMOS DER ERDE IM VÖLKERRECHT DES JUS
PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (1950); EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’
CRISIS 1919–1939 (1946).
37. European Convention on Human Rights,
https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c= (last visited Nov. 20,
2019).
38. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Non-alignement et droit international, 151 RECUEIL
DES COURS 339, 386 (1976).
414 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [35:3
of sovereign equality, a basic principle of the UN Charter, was not to
be understood in a narrow and legalistic way. It was “substantive
equality” (“égalité compensatrice”), an objective enshrined in
countless UN General Assembly resolutions on permanent
sovereignty over natural resources and eventually the Declaration of
the New International Economic Order of 1974.
39
That the tools of international law no longer operate to bring about
the new international economic order reflects the political defeat of
the third world in the 1980s. No doubt, “justice” remained a widely
endorsed objective, but in the 1990s it was assumed that it is better
achieved by deregulation, state facilitation of private enterprise and
free trade and that it must anyway be balanced with other types of
justice, including those of overall growth and development,
environmental protection, rule of law, and political stability. It is rarely
cited today, perhaps because it is both open-ended and tainted with
connotations to state planning and redistribution. But even if “justice”
was the name for the objective of international legal instruments, the
practical experience is that these instruments emerge as compromises
so that there is no single datum—no simple “justice”—anywhere
“behind” them to which they could be reduced.
40
In a time of
fragmentation, the Montaigne Principle imposed itself on us.
Instead, jurists have much more readily endorsed human rights to
address the teleology of international legal instruments. In the 1960s,
Friedmann was still careful to limit the influence of rights to regional
institutions. The “Third Basket” of the Helsinki accords of 1975 did
recognize the value of rights also in East-West relations. And as legal
theorists began to endow rights with trumping quality over
institutional policies, an increasing number of projects and preferences
began to be labelled in terms of the “human rights” of those who held
them. Looking around in the 1990s, Tom Franck wrote that “each
individual is entitled to choose an identity reflecting personal
preference . . . in composing that identity, each may select more than
39. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order 3 (May 1, 1974).
40. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1883, 1885–86 (2002).
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one allegiance.”
41
Characteristically optimistic. Such free-floating
individualism arose from the cultural transformations of the 1960s, the
collapse of religious, patriarchal and nationalist values, and the rise of
what would later be called “identity politics.” In due course, rights
were available everywhere in the West to counter the discretion that
had become an intrinsic part of modern, deformalized law whose
open-ended standards seemed to have empowered the law-appliers to
simply to do what they taught best. That was okay as long as those
preferences broadly reflected those of the relevant audience. But if
they did not . . . .
Eventually, human rights turned into extremely valuable assets.
What could be greater than having a preference that would override
every countervailing preference? As more and more preferences were
translated into the rights of their holders, activists began to worry. If
everything was a right, nothing was. How to separate “genuine” from
“fake” rights? There was no litmus test. A theory of natural rights was
invoked by some—but it could hardly be operated in the context of
modern administrative or juridical institutions. And thus the sphere of
politics was colonized by rights-talk. Some of this was innocuous, or
genuinely helpful. But one could see where this was going. Did racists
or misogynists have the right of free speech? Was there a right to bear
arms in public places? What about the religious fundamentalist’s
preference to educate their children at home? Did affirmative action
violate the rights of white men? The right to “security” is undoubtedly
an important human right—did this then mean that increasing policing
resources and the presence of CCTV cameras in public localities
should be seen as important human rights measures?
Now no good human rights lawyer would ever think this. They
would immediately retort that such policies are not part of “genuine”
human rights. Again, the anti-globalists are outraged: “So you say that
everyone’s rights are of equal concern—but in your practice, you
always override priorities that WE think of as important! Hypocrites!”
In the absence of clear criteria to distinguish “real” from “fake” rights,
the human rights camp seems to be merely trying to impose its values
on the world. “Why would their political priorities somehow
41. THOMASM.FRANCK, THEEMPOWEREDSELF: LAWANDSOCIETY IN THEAGE
OF INDIVIDUALISM 39 (2001).
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automatically override ours!” Think about economic, social, and
cultural rights (ESC rights), brought into the canon as a cold war
maneuver to finish up the implementation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948/1966). This seemed especially important in
order to show that human rights were blind to larger social problems.
Rights also had to do with distributing resources in a just way. If they
only had a “programmatic” character (as it was usual to assume), did
they not operate as a kind of party program designed to bind the hands
of legislators and finance ministries outside electoral policies? Were
human rights in truth social-democratic policies of the welfare state,
cleverly disguising themselves as “non-political” projects of realizing
pre-existing “rights”? For example, Philip Alston’s recent work as UN
special rapporteur on the relation of privatization to extreme poverty
is an excellent example of sophisticated human rights policy.
42
But it
is also economic policy and the question is whether it has any distance
to sophisticated socialist attention to capitalism’s dark side? And if
there is no difference—well, then what about the claims about
“universal and inalienable” or about the view of rights as a non-
political limit to politics? For those not already committed, human
rights could only appear as a leftist policy in unpolitical disguise.
Among institutions undermined were political parties and the
political process. A particularly important moment was when the
social democrats, panicking over declining electoral support, co-opted
rights as part of the “Third Way.” Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, and
Gerhard Schröder rose to power by supporting the rights of women,
minorities, and disadvantaged groups as well as internationalist
agendas of humanitarian intervention and the environment. But the
neoliberal co-optation of the Third Way undermined its credibility,
eventually bringing social democracy down and threatening to take
human rights with it.
43
By the time the financial crisis of 2008 had set
in rights had become infected by their association with a centrist elite
that spoke of free trade and privatization while presiding over
unending austerity and a massive growth of domestic and international
inequality. The Left had lost its bearings and left in its wake an
42. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,
2/25 U.N. Doc. A/73/396 (Sept. 26, 2018).
43. See generally SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN
UNEQUALWORLD (2018).
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increasingly cynical electorate looking for revenge in iconoclastic
attacks on political correctness and a reactionary attachment to
nationalist nostalgia.
None of this is to say that human rights have become meaningless,
of course. They still associate with inclusion and progressive change,
mostly because such are the objectives of that group of institutional
actors who identify themselves with that language. But human rights
have also, in the 1990s, become part of the routine of global
governance by institutions whose policies have become subject to
widespread disenchantment. As a result, that disenchantment has also
infected human rights. In the 1990s, human rights were able to claim
that they stood outside and above specific institutions, both
international and domestic. Having entered those institutions, rights
now find themselves just one type of technical knowledge among
others—security, development, environment—and with alternative
objectives. In such situation, politics will either become a struggle
between knowledges, with access limited to those who have obtained
the required expertise, or then an indignant rejection of all
“knowledge” as simply an unfair camouflage over contestable
priorities.
IV. THINKING ABOUT DISENCHANTMENT
I began this talk by referencing a powerful current of political
thinking in the mid-twentieth century that was highly critical of the
way modern men and women had become enchanted by the technical
and economic tools at their disposal. Max Horkheimer, Theodor
Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse believed that the rise of Fascism and
Nazism had to do with the way that enchantment had nullified moral
sensibilities and distorted the political culture, allowing access to
power for demagogues and extremists. Studies conducted under the
auspices of the Frankfurt school looked for an explanation for the
disaster in the development of what they called the authoritarian
personality, a particular type of human being that readily accepted and
even looked for a “strong leader” to resolve the anxieties that
modernity had awoken.
44
One of the late representatives of that line of
44. See generally THEODOR ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN
PERSONALITY (Verso ed., 2019) (including a new Introduction by Robert Gordon).
418 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [35:3
thinking, Zygmunt Bauman, even suggested that the Holocaust was a
child of modernity, that it could not have taken place in any other
conditions.
45
Does today’s anti-globalism resemble that earlier
moment? History never quite repeats itself as such. It does not provide
ready-made “lessons.” Nevertheless, it is a storehouse of experiences
and narratives through which the present may be assessed. Apart from
untried utopias for the future, needed as they are, what else is there to
reflect on in the present?
In the 1960s and early 1970s, great political and cultural changes
took place in the North as well as in the South. Some of these changes
were recorded in Friedmann’s Changing Structures, and supported
decolonization and the rise of human rights, the calls for economic
justice and national liberation. There was much violence around the
globe, some sped up by the Vietnam War, some with roots in local
injustices. The political roles of science and technology in governing
an increasingly globalized modernity was debated on many forums.
One of them was the German Sociological Association that went
through the so-called “positivism struggle” in the 1960s. On the Right,
men such as Ralf Dahrendorf, Karl Popper, and Hans Albert engaged
with the members of the Frankfurt school in analyzing the effects of
an increasingly economic and technological civilization on politics
and society. The debate was underlain by the theme of “enchanted by
the tools” and although the protagonists differed on many of its aspects
they shared a concern about the way such enchantment (that they
identified with “positivism”) seemed to lead into decisionism,
undermining what they called “reason” in politics, impoverishing
political debate and supporting demagogues and extremists of all
kinds. Both sides included participants who shared the trauma of
Nazism.
It is striking, as the reporter of the debate, Dahrendorf, wrote, that
none of the discussants endorsed “positivism” and that each in their
own way highlighted the interdependence between science and value,
reason and politics.
46
Popperian “fallibilism” shook hands with the
“dialectical” view of Adorno and others in reserving an important role
45. ZYGMUNTBAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THEHOLOCAUST 6–7, 12 (1989).
46. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Remarks on the Discussion, in THEODORW. ADORNO
ET AL., THE POSITIVISTDISPUTE INGERMAN SOCIOLOGY 123, 125–27, 129 (1977).
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for politics in the analysis and government of societies. Each believed
that enchantment with the technical or economic tools of
governance—the one-sided association of reason with instrumental
reason—tended toward irrationalism and tyranny. Each declared
themselves a supporter of enlightenment against myth—although they
utterly disagreed on which side myth stood.
Since that time, the notions of enlightenment and reason shared by
the debaters have been attacked as having themselves offshoots of
large, often Eurocentric myths about universal progress. Critical
theorists have had to grapple with post-colonial, post-structuralist, and
feminist challenges. The debate is anything but over.
47
But one of the
shared assumptions of critics on both sides has to do with the need to
look more closely into the assumptions of what it is we believe we
know, and what kind of politics that knowledge offers. One of the
participants in that debate, Jürgen Habermas, put forward at the time
what I believe is still a useful distinction between three types of
interest of knowledge (Erkenntnisintresse) with which we approach
the world that we hope to govern—technical, normative, and
emancipatory.
48
A technical interest has to do with the tools we have; are they good
for the purposes we use them? Can they be improved? Should other
tools be used instead? These are questions about the efficiency of our
practices that take the objectives of those practices for granted. I see
much of this in the ongoing debates on investment protection,
especially on the controversy over whether the relevant tools—
bilateral investment treaties (BITs)—adequately respond to the
objectives of stimulating investment and supporting domestic
development. Although opinions are divided, the notions are so
abstract that experts have no difficulty to reduce them to each other
and to move directly to the techniques whereby they might be realized
without further controversy.
49
How to make sure that the procedure is
non-biased, and that the arbitrators or judges are elected in the
47. See AMY ALLEN, THE END OF PROGRESS: DECOLONIZING THE NORMATIVE
FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICALTHEORY (2016).
48. See JÜRGENHABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE ANDHUMAN INTERESTS (1987).
49. See Martti Koskenniemi, It’s Not the Cases, It’s the System, 18 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 343, 349, 352 (2017).
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appropriate way? Focus is directed on jurisdiction, composition, and
procedure. But this hardly satisfies even the technical interest of
knowledge. For there still is no clear view of their effects, including
who wins and who loses. A recent study by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on the costs and
benefits of international investment agreements (IIAs) concluded its
review on the matter as follows:
While this increasingly rich literature makes important contributions on
what has and continues to motivate conclusions of IIAs, it offers little
information on the extent to which IIAs have actually delivered on these
expectations; this information is required to assess societal benefits and
costs in this area.
50
To be enchanted by a tool is to believe that there really are no other
relevant problems than technical ones. The course is cast, the
objectives are set, and the only question is how to reach them
efficiently and without friction. If only the system operates “as it is
supposed,” all will be fine. Much of 1990s global law—the expanding
authority of WTO panels, the International Criminal Court, the many
UN-sponsored post-conflict governance projects—now seems a little
like that. Progress was about things becoming more “international,”
less tied down in the bureaucratic structures of the state, to be managed
from the heights of New York or Geneva, Washington or Brussels.
Insisting on the actual effects, hard to measure as they anyway were,
seemed disruptive, perhaps even disloyal. Like my interlocutor(s) on
the plane back from New York, many of us had a stake in believing,
and having others believe, just that.
51
50. Joachim Pohl, Societal benefits and costs of International Investment
Agreements: A critical review of aspects and available empirical evidence 71
(OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2018/01, 2018). The
executive summary of the Report begins its conclusion with the following caveat:
“While a large number of claims have been made with respect to the societal benefits
and costs of IIAs, very few of them have been empirically tested, and a few of those
that have been tested have been confirmed empirically.” Id. at 4.
51. Having been involved in the setting up of the Iraqi sanctions regime in the
U.N. Security Council in 1990, I can testify to the utter unpreparedness of the
Council and its Secretariat, as well as the delegations, to the management of what
would gradually turn out to be a disaster for the vulnerable populations in Iraq and
one of the worst scandals of corruption in U.N. history, “Oil for Food.” This was an
extreme case of being enchanted by the rules and the sudden ability of U.N.
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But there are other questions. As long as it is conducted among
investment experts, the debate on the proposed investment court, for
example, is bound to be limited to a technical-procedural question.
What “increasing investment” or “domestic development” might
mean, whether they are the appropriate objectives, will not be studied
in any depth. As long as thinking does not encompass the concepts on
which legal techniques operate, the way they are translated into
policies and ultimate “effects,” it remains imprisoned—
“enchanted”—by those techniques as they have consolidated in time.
The passing of a resolution, or signing of a convention, is just a
beginning. The problem exists everywhere in international legal
practice. What do expressions such as “legitimate expectations,”
“immunity of state officials,” “war on terror,” “sustainable
development,” or “non-tariff barrier” mean? How do they allocate
powers and vulnerabilities? Each is the product of a historical moment,
carrier of a project, and the effect of some consensus. Each is also
blurred in its boundaries and often contested in its substance. The
notion of “development” in investment law cannot be pinned down in
numerical data derived from domestic GDPs because it is not clear
that the GDP can be taken as the relevant standard.
52
The normative interest of knowledge directs attention from the tools
to what they are tools for, and seeks to penetrate through the abstract
and diplomatic descriptions of technical analyses of particular tool-
regimes to their actual effects, provoking questions about choosing
between contrasting preferences of competing regimes—trade and
delegations to apply them “as they were supposed.” Martti Koskenniemi, Le Comité
Des Sanctions (crée par la résolution 661 (1990) du Conseil de securité), 37
ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 119 (1991).
52. Many would suggest that the Human Development Indicators, or in some
broader way the U.N. sustainable development goals, would provide a more relevant
standard. See Robert Costanza, Why GDP is Not an Accurate Measure of Economic
Growth, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Dec. 9, 2014),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/12/why-gdp-is-not-an-accurate-measure-
of-economic-growth/ (claiming that GDP is not a measure of overall societal well-
being as it does not measure the “real economy,” which includes “all things that
support human well-being”); see also OECD, Beyond GDP: Measuring What
Counts for Economic and Social Performance 13 (2018) (arguing that countries
should look “Beyond GDP” to alternative indicators to measure a country’s
development because GDP statistics alone do not accurately portray the health of a
country).
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environment; human rights and security; autonomy and integration.
What is it that we want? And who are we? These are questions that it
is utterly insufficient to examine in the bodies whose members are
already enchanted by the tools of which they are the experts. They
touch upon incommensurable value schemes, choosing between
“winners and losers.” They cannot be decided by empirical methods
or algorithms but require the involvement of the political
community.
53
But there is also a third interest of knowledge; one that is not only
about what our values or ends are, or how to realize them, but which
asks the question: “are they the values we should have, in view of
everything that we know about the world”? As our knowledge
increases, we may have reason to change our politics. This is the most
difficult of the three interests because it requires turning against the
commonsense view that we share to find out if some pathological
distortion already infects that view. The theme of enlightenment
against myth receives now a slightly different form. To be enchanted
by one’s tools is to share the commonsense view of their place in the
overall scheme of things—how is it then possible to take a critical
view one’s enchantment? Two alternatives seem available. Either one
adopts some external critique of that “overall scheme”—with the risk
of losing one’s audience and having to justify that “external” view
against an a priori reluctant audience. Or using the “internal”
contradictions, gaps and inconsistencies in the overall scheme of
things so as to seek to affect a change. One possible way forward here
is to break the boundary between knowledge and value, science and
politics. As Habermas once put it in one of his early articles, “the truth
of statements is ultimately tied up with the intention to live the true
life.”
54
Here the interest of knowledge departs from the tools and their
objectives, highlighting the tensions within and choices to be made
inside the “overall scheme of things,” inviting disenchantment with
purely economic-technical practices with the view to a larger view of
53. In many fields of international cooperation, producing relevant empirical
data is hard or impossible. The above-mentioned OECD study on the benefits and
costs of IIAs, for example, laments the fact that much of the relevant data is not
publicly available. Pohl, supra note 50, at 7.
54. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Interest, 9 INQUIRY 285, 300 (1966).
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their place in the whole.
55
This would be very demanding, of course,
and the possibility, perhaps even likelihood, remains that all that is
attained is what Sloterdijk labelled “enlightened false consciousness,”
the strategic exploitation of that larger view so as benefit one’s short-
term interests.
56
I will provide examples of this at the end of this talk.
V. BREAKING THE ENCHANTMENT
Let me finish by examining what learning from these three-partite
interests of knowledge might mean for today’s international law and
lawyers. There should clearly be more and more reliable analyses of
the effects our tools have in the world, to what extent they realize the
purposes we attribute to them. Or are they merely a routine that we
continue to follow because we are enchanted by it? Such analyses
satisfy an important technical interest; and we know they should be
closely aligned with the normative interest, that is to say, the interest
we have in being clear about what their purposes are, and their
distributive consequences. As long as enchantment continues, we keep
doing what we have always done, reproducing the world as we have
come to know it. So, it is often necessary to step outside the legal-
institutional world that is familiar to us and to ask about its effects in
the world. Might those effects be better realized by some other
institution?
But better strategic awareness—the ability to choose the right tool
to better attain an objective we have set for ourselves—may not always
suffice. For this takes those objectives for granted and is unable to
capture the way they are part of a larger, historical world of meanings
and understandings that offers us only certain, limited objectives. One
of the problems of politics, understood as a calculation and
management of preferences, is that it takes those preferences as given,
without asking the question about how we came to have them or
whether they are good for us. Or to put it more concretely, whether the
ideas of continuous growth and commercialism are ultimately in our
interest? Disenchantment should also lead to taking those preferences
themselves under scrutiny in view of what it is that we have learned
of the world. It asks the question of whether they are right and
55. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITSDISCONTENTS 968 (2018).
56. See generally SLOTERDIJK, supra note 11.
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sustainable and based on the best available (though always
incomplete) knowledge. Whose interests do they serve and whose do
they push aside? The emancipatory interest of knowledge seeks, in a
way, to alienate us from our inherited preferences, inviting us to take
a critical look at our politics with a view of what we have learned of
the world. This seems to me especially worthy for an international
law, one that aims to take a general, or global perspective on the
practices and preferences that people in different places and positions
have. To ask not only the question of how to fulfill our preferences but
what preferences we should have is to think of science and value, or
knowledge and politics, facts and norms, as inextricably linked.
No myth has enchanted modern lawyers more deeply than the
Promethean one about humans taking nature for their use. It is time to
let go of that myth. Marx—another enlightenment hero—was on to
something when he attacked human rights as the rights of an egoistic
individual and contrasted merely “political emancipation” with
emancipation of the human species. For Marx the life of every human
being was dependent on the nature of the social relations where they
lived.
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But in limiting his analysis to social relations he did not go far
enough. Today we know the human species is utterly dependent on the
life of other species and, indeed, the natural world itself. Many of our
most powerful economic, technical, or legal tools have not only shown
themselves useless for managing the relationship between the human
species and the surrounding world but have been uniformly directed
to the exploitation of the latter. That is a preference we have reason to
be critical of. While each tool may separately carry out a useful-
seeming narrow task, when they operate jointly as part of an
economic-technological world-system, they lead us into a future we
have no reason to wish for.
No knowledge, even if produced by the best available techniques,
is absolutely and unconditionally “true.” There is reason to be
skeptical. But there is no reason to be ignorant. We have little choice
but to operate with knowledge emanating from sources that we have
reason to believe have the greatest concern for and interest in
truthfulness. The most relevant datum regarding the human species
57. See Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE END
OFCLASSICALGERMAN PHILOSOPHY (1st ed., 1976).
2020] ENCHANTED BY THE TOOLS? 425
today comes often with numbers, especially numbers signifying
trends. Every month, close to seven million new human beings are
born; about 1.5 new Finlands descend on Earth. That makes annually
eighty-two million new humans. World population is now about 7.7
billion, a number expected to attain eleven billion in 2100. How long
can that continue? In most places, even raising the theme of birth
control is taboo. The growth of the human species is the most
significant natural element determining the conditions of life on earth.
That growth is largely responsible for global warming. According to
the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special
Report, an increase of the global temperature by 1.5 degrees may
already be attained in 2030, at the latest in 2054. In the conservative,
carefully worded language of the report that concentrates on
comparing the effects of a rise of 1,5 degrees to the (quite possible) 2
degrees, “[s]ome impacts may be long-lasting or irreversible, such as
the loss of some ecosystems.” Arctic areas will be hit two-three times
harder than other areas. Sea level rise up to 2100 will be anything from
0.27 to 0.77 meters, though local variations will be great. Extreme
weather conditions will become more common. Marine ecosystems,
and through them, fisheries, will be dramatically reduced, and the
reduction will double in case there is a rise of 2 degrees.
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The growth
of the human species is paralleled by the disappearance of other
species. According to a report by the Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) from
May 2019:
An average of around 25 per cent of species in assessed animal and plant
groups are threatened . . . , suggesting that around 1 million species already
face extinction, many within decades, unless action is taken to reduce the
intensity of drivers of biodiversity loss. Without such action, there will be
a further acceleration in the global rate of species extinction, which is
already at least tens to hundreds of times higher than it has averaged over
the past 10 million years.
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We should learn to be critical of our preferences. They are
unsustainable by what we know. Breaking the Promethean myth is
both very difficult and very easy. How so? Leaving Helsinki to teach
my course at NYU last year, I asked my daughter Aino if she would
like to accompany me like in many earlier years. She looked at me a
little sadly and said, “Dad, I think our family’s carbon footprint is
already large enough.”
EPILOGUE
On this day, November 5, 2019, when I am finishing the written text
of my Grotius talk, The Guardian publishes a report signed by 11,000
scientists around the world according to which climate change is
proceeding much faster than foreseen and that “the planet earth is
facing a climate emergency.” The report, originally published as a
“Viewpoint” in Bioscience concludes that “an immense increase of
scale in endeavors to conserve our biosphere is needed to avoid untold
suffering due to the climate crisis.”
60
On this day, November 5, 2019,
The New York Times publishes an article with the title “E.P.A. Relaxes
Rules that Limit Water Pollution from Coal Plants.” According to the
article, the new rules “are part of President Trump’s vast
environmental deregulation agenda aimed largely at eliminating rules
the fossil fuel industry finds burdensome and extending the life of
coal-burning power plants.”
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